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COMMENTS
TRADEMARKING "JEET KUNE DO"
Christopher Bucklin*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 20, 1973, martial arts legend Bruce Lee died at
the age of thirty-two.1 Through his brief but exceptional life,
Bruce Lee left a unique legacy that will likely never be dupli-
cated. Among his many accomplishments,2 probably his most
enduring contribution to society was his own personal expres-
sion of the martial arts: Jeet Kune Do.' Due to Bruce Lee's
enormous global popularity,4 the term "Jeet Kune Do" has
* Senior Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 40. J.D.
candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A. and B.S., San Francisco
State University.
1. See 1 JOHN LITTLE, BRUCE LEE-WORDS OF THE DRAGON 160 (1997)
[hereinafter LITTLE, WORDS OF THE DRAGON].
2. Many of Bruce Lee's achievements are summarized by the following
passage:
Bruce Lee (1940-1973) is generally considered the greatest martial
artist of the twentieth century. A true Renaissance man, Lee was a
talented artist, poet, philosopher, writer, and actor, apart from being a
formidable fighter. His insights into philosophy, physical fitness, self-
defense, and moviemaking, have been enjoyed and lauded by millions
of people around the world for well over two decades. He is the founder
of jeet kune do, the first martial art to ever be predicated on total free-
dom for the individual practitioner. A learned man, Lee attended the
University of Washington where he majored in philosophy. His per-
sonal library contains over 2,500 books on topics ranging from Eastern
yoga to Western psychoanalysis. His achievements and example con-
tinue to inspire athletes and artists from around the world.
2 JOHN LITTLE, BRUCE LEE-THE TAO OF GUNG Fu 199 (1997) [hereinafter
LITTLE, THE TAO OF GUNG Fu].
3. Jeet Kune Do literally means "way of the intercepting fist." 1 LITTLE,
WORDS OF THE DRAGON, supra note 1, at 164 n.5.
4. See 2 LITTLE, THE TAO OF GUNG FU, supra note 2, at 199. See also JOHN
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been used, directly or indirectly, to sell clothing, books, post-
ers, magazines, assorted memorabilia, instructional videos,
seminars, and self-defense classes. But who may actually use
the term "Jeet Kune Do"? Is it a protected trademark? If it is
a trademark, who has the authority to authorize its use?
What are the limitations, if any, of such use? These are some
of the issues addressed in this comment.
This comment first traces the origin and subsequent
chronology of the term "Jeet Kune Do."5 Relevant principles
of trademark law and case law precedent then follow.' Con-
sidered with respect to the law of trademarks, the issue is:
can Jeet Kune Do be trademarked?' The analysis section dis-
cusses such issues as ownership of the mark, the mark's dis-
tinctiveness, possible abandonment of the mark, dilution of
the mark's distinctiveness, third-party defenses, Bruce Lee's
intent regarding the mark, and Jeet Kune Do as a "class" of
martial arts.8 The comment then proposes that the Jeet Kune
Do mark may be a protectible trademark and suggests how
the estate of Bruce Lee could act to protect the mark.9
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origin of "Jeet Kune Do"
Bruce Lee was born in San Francisco's Chinatown on No-
vember 27, 1940 to Mr. and Mrs. Lee Hoi Chuen. 10 In 1953,
while growing up in Hong Kong, Bruce Lee began to study
Wing Chun, a style of Gung Fu, under grandmaster Yip
Man." When he was eighteen, Bruce Lee returned to the
United States at his parents' request. 2
In 1964, after living in the United States for five years
and having taught martial arts professionally, another Chi-
nese martial artist, who disliked Lee teaching Chinese mar-
LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN 183-85 (1996) [hereinafter LITTLE, THE
WARRIOR WITHIN]; Mark Graham, Bruce Lee Packs a Punch in Marketing, THE
SUNDAY TIMES (London), Sept. 27, 1998, at 12.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.B-C.
7. See infra Parts III, IV.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 187.
11. See id. at 188.
12. See id.
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tial arts to non-Chinese, challenged Lee to a fight. 3 Lee ac-
cepted the challenge and ultimately defeated his antagonist
in three minutes. 4 Although victorious, Lee was distraught
that the conflict took so long and left him so physically
drained.1" As a result, Lee completely reexamined his tradi-
tional approach to the martial arts. 6
Not wanting to confine himself to just one martial art,
Lee fervently researched other forms of combat in an effort to
acquire the very best techniques from a variety of arts. 7 In
addition to Wing Chun, Lee researched other combative forms
such as Western boxing, Thai boxing, fencing, Savate, wres-
tling, Judo, Aikido, Karate, and other styles of Gung Fu.8
Lee eventually concluded that no one martial art or "style"
completely encompassed the totality of combat. 9 Rather,
each martial art added something unique to a greater scheme
of fighting.2° As a result, Lee considered the greatest martial
artist to be without a single style, and instead one who pos-
sesses all styles, so that ultimately, he or she has no style at
all.2 ' As Lee stated: "I think the highest state of martial art,
in application, must have no absolute form."22 To achieve this
end, Lee wanted to establish, not a "style,"23 but an expression
of martial arts that liberated, rather than bound, an individ-
ual's abilities.24 This notion of abandoning the traditional,
fixed forms of martial arts in favor of liberated, free expres-
sion is the cornerstone of the art Bruce Lee created: "Jeet
Kune Do."2 As Lee asserted:
13. See id. at 189.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 189.
17. See LINDA LEE, THE BRUCE LEE STORY 175 (1989).
18. See id.; see also CHRIS KENT & TIM TACKETT, JEET KUNE Do
KICKBOXING 9 (1986).
19. See L. LEE, supra note 17, at 64. See also LITTLE, THE WARRIOR
WITHIN, supra note 4, at 107; infra note 292 and accompanying text.
20. See LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 107.
21. See 3 JOHN LITTLE, BRUCE LEE--JEET KUNE DO 27 (1997) [hereinafter
LITTLE, JEET KUNE DO]; see also infra note 292 and accompanying text.
22. 3 LITTLE, JEET KUNE DO, at 27.
23. See BRUCE LEE, TAO OF JEET KUNE DO 24 (1975); L. LEE, supra note 17,
at 44; LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 106-07; see also infra
note 292 and accompanying text.
24. See B. LEE, supra note 23, at 24; L. LEE, supra note 17, at 44; LITTLE,
THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 106-07.
25. See B. LEE, supra note 23, at 12.
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Jeet Kune Do favors formlessness so that it can assume all
forms and since Jeet Kune Do has no style, it can fit with
all styles. As a result, Jeet Kune Do utilizes all ways and
is bound by none and, likewise, uses any technique or
means which serve its end.26
Lee also claimed, "The art of Jeet Kune Do is simply to
simplify. It is being oneself;" 27 and, "Jeet Kune Do is the art
not founded on techniques or doctrine. It is just as you are."28
Believing in these principles, Lee even placed Chinese char-
acters around his class Jeet Kune Do emblem that translated
to: "Using no way as way; having no limitation as limita-
tion."
29
To guide his practitioners to attain this "formlessness,"
Lee established four major tenets defining Jeet Kune Do's
core philosophy: (1) research your own experience; (2) absorb
what is useful; (3) reject what is useless; and (4) add what is
specifically your own."
Lee was revolutionary because his self-developed art of
Jeet Kune Do was the first martial art based on an individ-
ual's total liberation of means, rather than a traditional set of
rigid techniques." Moreover, Lee acknowledged that "the
success of Jeet Kune Do lies in its freedom, both to use tech-
nique and to dispense with it."
32
Since Lee disliked the notion of martial art "styles, '3  he
created the term "Jeet Kune Do" more for convenience than
for commercial value, i.e., to give his personal expression of
the martial arts some kind of designation.34 "Jeet Kune Do"
literally means "way of the intercepting fist."" Lee coined the
term sometime in 1965 or 1966,36 after he reexamined his ap-
proach to the martial arts, researched other combative forms,
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 204.
29. See LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 112.
30. See id. at 114.
31. See 2 LITTLE, THE TAO OF GUNG Fu, supra note 2, at 199.
32. B. LEE, supra note 23, at 22.
33. See id. at 24; L. LEE, supra note 17, at 44; LITTLE, THE WARRIOR
WITHIN, supra note 4, at 106-07; see also infra note 292 and accompanying text.
34. See 1 LITTLE, WORDS OF THE DRAGON, supra note 1, at 127.
35. See 1 id. at 164 n.5.
36. See 3 LITTLE, JEET KUNE Do, supra note 21, at 47; Rick Tucci, Dan Ino-
santo Returns to Black Belt, BLACK BELT, Aug. 1995, at 48.
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and formulated his own expression of martial arts."
The term itself references a "stop-hit," which is an effi-
cient means of countering an attack in fencing.38 When an
opponent attacks in fencing, a stop-hit involves parrying and
counter-attacking at the same time, rather than in two indi-
vidual steps.39 This technique appealed to Lee because it
symbolized a highly effective and efficient way to hit an oppo-
nent quickly during an attack," which is ideal in Jeet Kune
Do. Combining "stop-hit" with the Cantonese word for "fist,"
Lee coined the term "Jeet Kune Do."'
Lee's fame and eclectic personal expression of martial
arts resulted in worldwide recognition for himself and his art
of Jeet Kune Do.4 As an inevitable result of popularity, other
individuals infringed upon Lee's proprietary rights. To de-
termine whether actual infringement occurred requires some
background information on relevant U.S. trademark law.
B. Trademark Law
1. Defining "Trademark"
A "trademark" is defined by the Lanham Act, the federal
trademark statute, as:
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a
bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to reg-
ister on the principal register established by this Act, to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source
is unknown.4'
37. See LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 190.
38. See DAN INOSANTO, JEET KUNE DO-THE ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF
BRUCE LEE 66-67 (1980).
39. See id.
40. See id. Simplicity, directness, efficiency, and adaptability are all highly
important principles of Jeet Kune Do. See B. LEE, supra note 23, at 12.
41. See INOSANTO, supra note 38, at 66-67.
42. See 2 LITTLE, THE TAO OF GUNG Fu, supra note 2, at 199. See also
LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 183-85; Graham, supra note 4.
43. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998). The
term "Jeet Kune Do," at least in a teaching context, is more accurately a "serv-
ice mark," which serves the same function as a "trademark" except that the
former designates services rather than goods. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:1 (4th ed. 1998). In
20001 515
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2. Distinctiveness
All trademarks must be distinctive to receive protection. 4
The U.S. Supreme Court has asserted two ways to achieve
distinctiveness in a mark: (1) by being inherently distinctive,
or (2) by acquiring distinctiveness through "secondary mean-
ing" that results when a mark is merely descriptive on its
face-which would ordinarily preclude it from trademark
status-but which consumers have come to nevertheless rec-
ognize as an identifier of the product or its source." If a mark
cannot gain (or retain) distinctiveness, it is deemed generic
and cannot be a trademark."
A mark is inherently distinctive if it is so distinguishable
that no showing of secondary meaning is necessary," e.g., a
mark that is a completely imaginary word. In contrast, a
mark that is not inherently distinctive is not distinguishable
on its own, and cannot be deemed a trademark without a
showing of secondary meaning,4" e.g., a mark that is composed
of a commonly used word that, by itself, does not indicate a
source or product yet in context of public perception is recog-
nized as a source or product identifier.
Within these two major classifications, there are four
sub-categories of distinctiveness: (1) arbitrary and fanciful,
(2) suggestive, (3) descriptive, and (4) generic. 9 Marks that
fall within the first two categories are inherently distinctive,
while a "descriptive" mark is not inherently distinctive, and
hence requires a showing of secondary meaning for protection
addition, if "Jeet Kune Do" were used as a name of a business, it would be more
appropriately a "trade name." See Lanham Act § 45. This comment uses the
term "trademark" instead of "service mark" or "trade name" since "trademark"
is commonly used to refer to these types of marks and these terms ordinarily
have the same legal requirements. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra, § 3:1.
44. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:2.
45. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
46. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:2. A term is generic either by in-
herently lacking distinctiveness (e.g., "soap," "car," "cereal," etc.), or by being a
once valid trademark that subsequently lost its distinctiveness over time (e.g.,
"aspirin," "cellophane," "escalator," "yo-yo," "nylon," and "kerosene"). See JANE
C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 339-49 (2d ed.
1996).
47. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:2; see also infra notes 52-54 and
accompanying text (citing examples of inherently distinctive marks).
48. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:2; see also infra note 60 and ac-
companying text (citing examples of descriptive marks that acquired secondary
meaning).
49. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:2.
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as a trademark." As mentioned earlier, a mark that is "ge-
neric" has no distinctiveness by definition, and cannot become
a trademark.5
An "arbitrary" mark uses a fairly common word or set of
words, yet when utilized in context of a particular good or
service, does not suggest or describe any of its qualities or
characteristics.52 In contrast, a "fanciful" mark consists of
words that are completely made-up, obsolete, or otherwise
wholly unfamiliar to the typical purchaser. 3 "Suggestive"
marks hint at what the product or service is, yet do not de-
scribe it enough to lose distinctiveness. 4 These three types of
marks are deemed "strong" trademarks because of their in-
herent distinctiveness,5 with "fanciful" marks being the
strongest. 6 Owning a "strong" mark is important since these
marks receive the greatest protection in a variety of markets
and circumstances.
As opposed to these inherently distinctive categories, a
"descriptive" mark cannot stand as a trademark on its own,
and requires a showing of secondary meaning. 8 Typically, a
mark falls within this category because it merely describes
some aspect or characteristic of a good or service. 9 However,
since even general or descriptive terms may acquire distinct
public recognition, these marks may still become trademarks
with proof of secondary meaning.6' Absent such a showing,
however, a "descriptive" mark cannot become a trademark.6'
50. See 2 id.
51. See supra text accompanying note 46. Since a "generic" mark inherently
has no distinctiveness, it is somewhat of a misnomer to call it a sub-category of
distinctiveness.
52. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:11. Examples of arbitrary marks
include "V-8" (i.e., the vegetable juice beverage) and "Ivory" soap. See 2 id.
53. See 2 id. § 11:5. Examples of fanciful marks include "Clorox," "Kodak,"
and "Polaroid." See 2 id. § 11:8.
54. See 2 id. § 11:12. An example of a suggestive mark is the mark for the
bus transportation company, "Greyhound," which suggests speed and sleekness.
See 2 id.
55. See 2 id. § 11:4.
56. See 2 id. § 11:6.
57. See 2 id.
58. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:15.
59. See 2 id. §§ 11:15-:16.
60. See 2 id. § 11:15. Examples of descriptive marks that acquired secon-
dary meaning include, "International Business Machines" ("IBM") and "General
Electric" ("GE").
61. See 2 id.
2000]
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Testing distinctiveness of marks that employ foreign
words is a two-step process. These words are first translated
into English and then evaluated using the same tests as de-
scribed above.62 The ultimate issue is whether the mark
would be inherently distinctive or merely descriptive to con-
sumers who speak the particular language of the mark in
question.63 Foreign marks found descriptive must, as with
English marks, show secondary meaning among its particular
language-speaking consumers to qualify as protected.64 Also,
if the foreign term uses a generic designation, it cannot be a
valid trademark.65
Under U.S. trademark law, one need not register a
trademark to obtain enforceable rights in the mark.66 While
registering a mark with the federal Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO") may provide nationwide trademark protec-
tion,67 the use of the mark to identify a single source is what
ultimately creates a trademark.68 If the use of a mark causes
recognition of a source for a particular product or service, a
protected trademark results. 9
A trademark does not need to specifically identify its
owner's name.76 Rather, a trademark should indicate to the
public a single source, though the public is not required to
62. See 2 id. § 11:34.
63. See 2 id. For example, the Chinese characters "Tung Fong Jih Pao,"
which were used as the name of a Chinese newspaper, were found merely de-
scriptive. The term literally means "Oriental Daily News." See In re Oriental
Daily News, Inc., 230 U.S.P.Q. 637 (T.T.A.B. 1986).
64. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:34.
65. See 2 id. § 12:41. For example, the Hungarian term "Ha-Lush-Ka" was
held a generic mark in the United States since it literally translates to mean
"egg noodles." See Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290
F.2d 845 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
66. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 19:3.
67. See 3 id. § 26:31. In addition to receiving nationwide protection, federal
trademark registration has further benefits: attaining "incontestable" status
after five consecutive years of use; serving as a notice and warning of use to
others; barring imported goods bearing infringing marks; providing protection
against counterfeiting; leaving open the possibility of court-ordered treble (i.e.,
enhanced) damages upon infringement; providing certain evidentiary advan-
tages to a mark's owner; permitting use of the "®" symbol, the phrase "Regis-
tered in U.S. Patent Office," or "U.S. Pat. Off." to denote federal registration;
and confirming the ownership and validity of a mark, product, or business. See
GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 46, at 227-28.
68. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 19:3.
69. See 3 id. § 3:3.
70. See 3 id. § 3:7. For example, the marks "Cheer," "Tide," and "Crest" are
all product name trademarks belonging to Procter & Gamble. See 3 id.
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know that source's name.71 As long as the public recognizes
the mark as deriving from a single source, the mark may
serve as a trademark even though the public may not know
the name of the source.72
Like a word, a single letter or group of letters not consti-
tuting a word, including an abbreviation," may also be a
trademark." An arrangement of letters that is arbitrary or
well-known publicly is more likely to be recognized since this
adds to the mark's distinctiveness.75 However, a series of
unique letters that merely abbreviates a generic term is also
deemed generic. 6
3. Abandonment
"Abandonment" of a mark causes its original owner to
lose exclusive trademark rights in the mark,77 even if regis-
tered." Once abandoned, the mark becomes part of the public
domain and may be used by anyone.79 Subsequently, an
original user cannot regain rights in an abandoned mark
simply by reviving use of the mark."
Abandonment may occur in several ways. First, actions
of the original trademark owner may bring about "non-
intentional" abandonment." Non-intentional abandonment
occurs via uncontrolled licensing of a mark,82 assigning a
71. See 3 id. § 3:9.
72. See 3 id.
73. See 3 id. § 7:18. For example, WVW" is a valid trademarked abbreviation
for "Volkswagen." See 3 id.
74. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 7:9. This aspect of trademark law is
relevant to this comment because ever since Bruce Lee coined the term "Jeet
Kune Do," it has commonly been referred to in abbreviated form, i.e., "JKD."
See INOSANTO, supra note 38, at 66-67. Hence, any conclusions drawn regard-
ing trademark protections or limitations of the "Jeet Kune Do" mark also apply
to the abbreviated "JKD" mark.
75. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 7:10.
76. See 1 id. § 7:11. For example, "pvp" was held a generic abbreviation of
the product "polyvinylpyrrolidone." In re General Aniline & Films Corp., 136
U.S.P.Q. 306 (T.T.A.B. 1962).
77. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:1.
78. See 2 id. § 17:3.
79. See 2 id. § 17:1.
80. See 2 id. § 17:3.
81. See 2 id. § 17:5.
82. See 2 id. § 17:6. A mark may lose its significance as an indicator of
quality (and therefore become abandoned) if it is licensed without sufficient con-
trol over the product(s) sold under the mark by the licensee. See 2 id. § 17:6.
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mark apart from its goodwill," or the mark becoming ge-
neric. 4 In each of these instances, the mark, either through
an act or non-act of the original owner, loses its meaning as
an indicator of source,8 and hence fails to act as a trademark.
Second, abandonment may occur through subsequent
non-use of the mark.86 Since use of a mark to identify a single
source creates a trademark right,87 a mark's ensuing non-use
following some initial usage may cause abandonment.88 Mod-
ern trademark law requires a showing of "intent not to re-
sume"89 use of a mark to find abandonment by non-use. ° To
overcome this non-use claim, an alleged mark owner must
prove not merely an intent to continue some token use of the
mark, but rather intent to resume commercial use. 1 An al-
leged mark owner may also refute abandonment by non-use
with a showing of valid reasons,92 e.g., temporary suspension
of use caused by external factors. 3
Third, non-use for a prolonged period creates a presump-
tion of abandonment. 94 The Lanham Act asserts that three
consecutive years of non-use constitutes "prima facie aban-
donment,"95 i.e., a rebuttable presumption of abandonment an
alleged trademark holder has the burden of overcoming.
Abandonment requires "clear and convincing" proof since
it involves the forfeiture of acquired rights.96 To meet this
burden, mere self-serving testimony from an alleged trade-
mark owner may be rebutted by objective evidence, such as
actions of the alleged trademark holder that suggest aban-
83. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:7. Since assigning a mark apart
from its goodwill may cause the mark to no longer designate a certain nature
and/or quality of goods, such action may constitute abandonment. See 2 id.
84. See 2 id. § 17:8; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
85. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:5.
86. See 2 id. § 17:9. The Lanham Act defines "use" as "the bona fide use of a
mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in
a mark." Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998).
87. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 19:3.
88. See 2 id. § 17:9.
89. See Lanham Act § 45.
90. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:11.
91. See 2 id.
92. See 2 id.
93. See 2 id. § 17:16. Examples of such valid external factors include war, a
labor strike, bankruptcy, and unprofitable sales. See 2 id.
94. See 2 id. § 17:18.
95. 2 Id.
96. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:12.
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donment.97
In particular, failure to sue third-party infringers may
evidence abandonment.98 The failure to prosecute infringers
often weakens a mark through unchecked, widespread use.99
That is to say, abandonment is really not at issue here since
this requires showing that a mark has lost all significance as
an indicator of origin.00 Instead, the rationale is that by not
regulating third-party use of a mark, it has lost its strength.10'
As a result, failure to sue known infringers is really only rele-
vant to abandonment when showing that a mark has lost all
of its significance.0 2 Further, abandonment might not be
found where a trademark owner does not object to some third-
party uses of a mark, while objecting to others (e.g., only
those that specifically conflict with the holder's use of the
mark),0 3 since an owner is not obligated to sue every infring-
ing use.104
4. Dilution
Even the subtlest unauthorized use of a mark may
weaken or reduce its distinctiveness through a process known
as "dilution."' Dilution, unlike blatant trademark infringe-
ment, involves the gradual weakening of a mark's strength
through two forms: blurring and tarnishment."' First, dilu-
tion by "blurring" entails actual or potential customer confu-
sion, not necessarily as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation,
but as to unauthorized use of the mark on goods or services
other than those of the original owner's.0 7 Such actual or po-
97. See 2 id. § 17:13.
98. See 2 id. § 17:17.
99. See 2 id.
100. See 2 id.
101. See 2 id.
102. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:17.
103. See 2 id.
104. See 2 id.
105. See 3 id. § 24:71. Despite the dilution doctrine's potentially broad appli-
cation, the Lanham Act specifically exempts "fair use" of a mark in comparative
advertising, noncommercial use, and all forms of news reporting and commen-
tary. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)
(1998).
106. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, §§ 24:67-:69.
107. See 3 id. § 24:68. The Lanham Act does not require similar products to
find blurring, in that it can occur "regardless of the presence or absence of...
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties." Lanham
Act § 45. This being the case, hypothetical examples of dilution by blurring in-
2000]
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tential use of the same mark on different products weakens
the mark's strength."8 Second, dilution by "tarnishment" is
the degrading of a mark's public reputation and goodwill,
typically through unauthorized use of the mark in obscene,
illegal, or unwholesome products." 9 As with blurring, dilution
of this sort reduces a mark's identification capacity, thereby
diminishing its effect as a trademark."'
The Lanham Act specifically grants the owner of a "fa-
mous mark" the special right to claim dilution protection."'
To determine whether a mark is "distinctive and famous," the
Lanham Act designates eight factors to consider:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of
the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connec-
tion with the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of
the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which
the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with
which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading ar-
eas and channels of trade used by the marks' [sic] owner
and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
clude third parties selling products like "Disney" aspirin, "Nike" light bulbs, and
"Pepsi" tires.
108. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:68.
109. See 3 id. § 24:95. Actual examples of dilution by tarnishment include
the children's board game "Candyland" being diluted by the Internet web site
"candyland.com," which contained sexually explicit material; "Budweiser" beer
being diluted by "Buttweiser" printed on T-shirts; and "Toys 'R' Us" being di-
luted by the Internet web site "adultsrus.com," which sold adult sexual prod-
ucts. See 3 id.
110. See 3 id.
111. See Lanham Act § 43(c). This notion should not be interpreted to mean
that only famous marks can be protected as a trademark. Fundamentally, a
mark must be distinctive in order to be a trademark. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra
note 43, § 11:2. While all trademarks must be "distinctive," only a small num-
ber are actually "famous." See 3 id. § 24:92. Though deeming a mark "famous"
is not required for trademark protection, famous and/or strong marks receive
greater protection than weaker marks where likelihood of confusion between a
mark's owner and an alleged infringer is in dispute. See 4 id. § 29:61. Thus, it
is beneficial for a mark to be considered "famous."
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(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the
principal register."'
In deciding weather a mark is "famous," a court weighs
each factor independently, and then examines the cumulative
result.113 Moreover, a court is not limited to these eight con-
siderations,"' and may review additional factors it deems
relevant to a particular case.
Dilution case law asserts that only strong marks have the
requisite distinctiveness to be diluted."' Conversely, dilution
is not possible with weak marks which have lost their dis-
tinctiveness.11 6 But how strong must a mark be to merit dilu-
tion protection? At the very least, the mark must have more
"distinctiveness" and "strength" than that minimally required
of a trademark."7 Some marks, such as nationally famous
marks, certainly meet this standard."' However, other marks
are well-known only to a specifically defined region, industry,
or market."' In these instances, the lack of substantial na-
tionwide fame will likely invalidate a dilution claim in the
case of dissimilar products, since the impact of alleged dilu-
tion will probably be inconsequential."' In contrast, if a mark
famous to a small population or market segment is used by
another in the same or similar segment, the original owner
may assert the Lanham Act's dilution provisions to protect
the owner's rights in the mark. 2'
5. Extent of Trademark Protection
The Lanham Act's authority is not necessarily limited to
the United States. U.S. trademark protection reaches activi-
ties in foreign nations if such activities affect a holder's
112. Lanham Act § 43(c).
113. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
114. See Lanham Act § 43(c).
115. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:108.
116. See 3 id.
117. See 3 id. § 24:109.
118. See 3 id. "Coca-Cola," "Ford," and "McDonald's" are all clear examples of
nationally famous marks.
119. See 3 id. § 24:112.
120. See 3 id.
121. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:112.
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trademark rights in the United States and involve U.S. inter-
state commerce. 12  For example, where a foreign party uses
an American holder's mark on products imported into the
United States, the Lanham Act may impose liability. 12 This
protection may also apply when a foreign party performs al-
legedly infringing acts that only indirectly affect U.S. com-
merce.124 Finally, protection occurs when a domestic infring-
ing party uses a mark solely for export to foreign nations.
25
Further, many nations recognize the "famous marks doc-
trine" as a means of protecting well known, yet unregistered,
foreign marks.' Though many countries do not protect un-
registered marks, the famous marks doctrine is an exception
to the general rule.'27 Although the level of protection varies
with each country, 28 the famous marks doctrine appears in
some international trade agreements 129 and recognizes the
fame of a mark, even when such fame results from its popu-
larity in other countries.2 0
6. Defenses
Despite the potentially broad rights associated with
trademarks, trademark owners cannot delay for too long in
asserting their rights against infringers. In addition to aban-
122. See 3 id. § 25:58. Bringing suit in this situation assumes a showing of
personal and/or subject-matter jurisdiction over a defendant in a U.S. court.
See 4 id. §§ 29:56, :58. Assuming jurisdiction requirements are met, an Ameri-
can court has the authority to bar a party from certain acts domestically and/or
internationally. See 4 id. § 29:60. However, turbulent international relations
as well as foreign legal systems in conflict with American law, may prevent such
international decrees. See 4 id.
123. See 4 id. § 29:56.
124. See 4 id. § 29:57. An example of indirect foreign infringement occurs
when a foreign party manufactures and sells goods with a domestic party's
mark on it (without authorization) solely within foreign markets (i.e., no impor-
tation of the goods to the United States), and American visitors to the foreign
markets buy the goods and bring them back to the United States. See Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
125. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 29:59.
126. See 4 id. § 29:61.
127. See 4 id.
128. See 4 id.
129. See 4 id. § 29:63. Both the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) recognize
the famous marks doctrine. See 4 id.
130. See 4 id. § 29:64. This spillover effect of a mark's fame can occur even
when the products that the mark represents are not available in that country.
See 4 id.
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donment, an owner's continued procrastination may allow an
alleged infringer to claim a defense of either statute of limita-
tions"' or estoppel by laches.'32 First, statute of limitations
provisions establish maximum time periods for bringing or
enforcing certain actions.'33 The Lanham Act provides no spe-
cific statute of limitations for trademark infringement ac-
tions.' Nevertheless, most courts adopt the forum state's
statute of limitations for similar sorts of actions,'35 which
varies from state to state.'36 However, in cases where delay in
bringing suit is an issue, it is the laches defense that most of-
ten prohibits both monetary and injunctive relief.'37
Estoppel by laches occurs when a trademark owner's de-
lay in bringing suit results in prejudice to the alleged in-
fringer, and serves as some bar to relief.'38 Though this de-
fense is more popular than asserting a statute of limitations
violation, some courts nonetheless use the closest state stat-
ute of limitations as a guide to rule on the validity of a laches
defense.'39 Although a laches defense may limit certain mone-
tary and injunctive remedies, courts seldom issue permanent
injunctions when a likelihood of confusion between a trade-
mark holder and an infringer's products is shown. 4 ° Indeed,
a strong showing of likelihood of confusion may completely
invalidate a laches defense.' In contrast, a laches defense is
more persuasive where other factors favor the alleged in-
fringer's position, e.g., the mark becoming generic, implied
consent to use the mark, an excessive delay in claiming in-
131. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:33.
132. See 5 id. § 31:2; see also infra text accompanying notes 138-49.
133. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 937 (6th ed. 1990).
134. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:33.
135. See 5 id. For example, an analogous state suit to federal trademark in-
fringement is a tort against property; a corresponding action to Lanham Act
§ 43(a) false advertisement claims include those under state tort statutes, statu-
tory liability, fraud, and injury to property; and state fraud statutes provide a
similar action to both Lanham Act § 43(a) false attribution of authorship claims
and to Lanham Act § 38 fraud claims. See 5 id. § 31:33 n.6.
136. State statute of limitations applied in Lanham Act suits typically range
from two to six years. See 5 id.
137. See 5 id. § 31:1.
138. See 5 id. § 31:2. McCarthy also defines estoppel by laches with the fol-
lowing equation: Estoppel by laches = delay x prejudice, where varying amounts
of either "delay" and/or "prejudice" may result in estoppel by laches. See 5 id.
139. See 5 id. § 31:1; supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
140. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:6.
141. See 5 id. § 31:10.
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fringement, an infringer's use of the mark in good faith,
and/or no likelihood of confusion between the marks of the
alleged owner and alleged infringer.'42 However, with the
possible exception of abandonment through excessive delay,
the laches defense will likely fail where there has been
knowing and deliberate infringement.'43
The amount of delay necessary to establish a laches de-
fense varies.44 Laches defenses have been rejected for delays
ranging from four months to thirteen years.1 45 Conversely,
other cases found laches defenses valid for delays ranging
from three to sixty-nine years.' Therefore, there is no fixed
rule regarding the amount of delay that merits a laches de-
fense. 147 Without established guidelines, this defense's appli-
cability varies with each case.148 In applying this doctrine,
courts must weigh the specific facts and circumstances of the
case, the interests and equities of both parties, and the public
interest. 149
Another possible defense that an alleged infringer may
raise is "acquiescence." 5 ° Acquiescence involves a delay in
bringing suit and an implication of active consent by the
trademark owner, whether by word or action, to use the
mark."' A showing of reliance on this consent may not only
provide a defense against infringement, but may also prevent
a trademark owner's attempted revocation of consent."' As
with laches, however, the acquiescence defense may be wholly
negated by a clear showing of likelihood of confusion between
the marks of the alleged owner and alleged infringer."'
C. Case Law
Little case law exists in the area of trademark rights re-
lating to martial arts. However, a few cases demonstrate how
142. See 5 id. § 31:7.
143. See 5 id. § 31:9.
144. See 5 id. §§ 31:29-:30.
145. See 5 id. § 31:29.
146. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:30.
147. See 5 id. § 31:22.
148. See 5 id.
149. See 5 id.
150. See 5 id. § 31:41.
151. See 5 id.
152. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:42.
153. See 5 id. § 31:41.
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far trademark rights in this area can reach.
In the case of Gracie v. Gracie,' the federally registered
trademark "Gracie Jiu-Jitsu" provided the basis for injunctive
relief against a family member's use of the mark in associa-
tion with his martial arts school. 15' Though a five-year delay
in filing suit resulted in a laches defense claim, the court still
found for the mark owner.'56 The court ruled that the owner's
delay was neither unreasonable nor inexcusable given other
suits involving the owner, as well as the owner's lack of no-
tice. 5 7 The facts that the alleged infringer shared the "Gra-
cie" family name and was an active practitioner and teacher
of the Gracie style of Jiu-Jitsu for many years were immate-
rial in the court's ruling. Gracie demonstrates that a feder-
ally registered mark receives significant protection, even
where there are seemingly favorable facts on the side of the
alleged infringer.' 8 It also demonstrates how mitigating cir-
cumstances, such as continuous litigation and lack of notice,
can overcome a laches defense.'
In contrast, the court in Chang School of Judo & Karate,
Inc. v. Dragon Gym, Inc.60 granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of the defendant because the plaintiff could not prove he
was the mark's senior user.' In Chang, the mark "T.K.A."
was allegedly conceived by the plaintiff to abbreviate the con-
cept of concurrently teaching techniques from Tae Kwon Do,
Karate, and Aikido. 6' The plaintiff asserted that he divulged
this mark and its teaching premise to the defendant as a pro-
spective business partner. After the breakdown of partner-
ship negotiations, the defendant subsequently registered the
154. Gracie v. Gracie, No. C94-4156SC, 1998 WL 164955, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 1998).
155. See id.
156. See id. at *1-*2.
157. See id. at *2.
158. See GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 46, at 227-28; 3 MCCARTHY, supra
note 43, § 26:31.
159. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
160. Chang Sch. of Judo & Karate, Inc. v. Dragon Gym, Inc., No. 89-3064,
1991 WL 15282, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1991).
161. See id. at *1. A "senior user" is the party that first uses or intends to
use a mark. In contrast, a "junior user" is a party that seeks to exploit a mark,
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mark in the state of Pennsylvania163 and used it for his own
business purposes.6 4 The court held that, even if the plaintiff
in fact originated the mark, the plaintiffs lack of evidence
showing actual use of the mark voided his claim of trademark
infringement.' Chang illustrates that it is not enough to
merely invent a mark; instead, to qualify as a trademark, ac-
tual use of the mark in some capacity must occur.166
Finally, in Suh v. Yang,'67 the district court ruled that the
term "Kuk Sool" was a generic term for a form of Korean mar-
tial arts.' 68 Applying the established trademark principle of
translating foreign terms into their English equivalent to
evaluate distinctiveness,' 6 ' the court found "Kuk Sool" to
mean "national martial arts" or "traditional martial arts" in
Korean.' ° The plaintiff wholly created the mark, extensively
used the mark for several decades, and registered the mark in
Canada, England, and over half of the United States.' Nev-
ertheless, the court ruled that the term itself merely desig-
nated a type or "class" of martial arts. 2 As such, the term
was too broad to give exclusive trademark rights to the plain-
tiff. Suh suggests that even where a mark is invented by a
single source, used at length over time in a variety of jurisdic-
tions, and significantly registered, a finding that the mark is
"generic" completely invalidates any claim of trademark in-
fringement."3
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The term "Jeet Kune Do" has great monetary value,
whether used to sell merchandise, self-defense classes, or in
other forms of commercial endeavors. Indeed, if considered a
"trademark," the party owning the mark's exclusive rights
would have the option of preventing others from using the
163. See id. at *2.
164. See id. at *1-*2.
165. See id. at *2.
166. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 19:3.
167. Suh v. Yang, 987 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 1997).
168. See id. at 792.
169. See id. at 790; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:34.
170. See Suh, 987 F. Supp. at 790.
171. See id. at 786.
172. See id. at 792. The court equated the class of martial arts "Kuk Sool"
represents to that of other non-registerable classes like Karate, Gung Fu, and
Tae Kwon Do. See id.
173. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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mark and/or licensing its use for profit. But can "Jeet Kune
Do" qualify as a trademark?'74 Even if found distinct, has the
mark been abandoned?175 Are there any implications to the
mark being "famous" to a particular population segment?'76
Over the past twenty-seven years, has the mark become "di-
luted"?177 If found a trademark, how would this affect those
who have used the mark for commercial purposes in the past
twenty-seven years?178 These are some of the issues ad-
dressed in the following analysis.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
A. Ownership of "Jeet Kune Do"
Who would appropriately own the trademark rights to
the "Jeet Kune Do" ("JKD") mark if such rights are merited?
Since Bruce Lee never sold or assigned his rights to the mark,
and since all property rights were eventually transferred to
his estate upon his death,'79 the estate of the late Bruce Lee
("Estate") would presumably own the trademark rights to the
JKD mark. As a result, this analysis centers on the Estate's
perspective.
B. Distinctiveness
One of the most fundamental issues is whether the term
"Jeet Kune Do" is distinctive enough to merit trademark
status.80 Trademark precedent requires translation of a term
composed of foreign words into English to evaluate its dis-
tinctiveness.' "Jeet Kune Do" translates to "way of the in-
tercepting fist."8' Given how the term was derived and sub-
sequently used, the JKD mark arguably falls within one of
the three sub-categories of distinctiveness, "fanciful," "sugges-
174. See infra Part IV.B.
175. See infra Part IV.C.
176. See infra Part IV.D.
177. See infra Part IV.D.
178. See infra Part IV.E.
179. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, Bruce Lee's former at-
torney and attorney of the Bruce Lee Estate (Nov. 11, 1998). After a compli-
cated five-year probate proceeding, all of Bruce Lee's estate passed to his widow,
Linda Lee Cadwell. See id.
180. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:2.
181. See 2 id. § 11:34.
182. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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tive," or "descriptive.' 83
First, because Bruce Lee coined "Jeet Kune Do" out of his
imagination 4 and the term could not be reasonably confused
with any other martial art then existing,'85 the facts indicate
that the mark is the most distinctive type of all: "fanciful.'
8 6
This is a strong argument since a fanciful mark is one that is
made-up, obsolete, or otherwise wholly unfamiliar to the typi-
cal purchaser. 7  It is certain that Bruce Lee made up the
183. For various reasons, the Jeet Kune Do mark would probably not be con-
sidered either "arbitrary" or "generic." First, "Jeet Kune Do" is not likely "arbi-
trary" since the term, when translated, does suggest some characteristics of
Bruce Lee's art. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:11. Second, "Jeet Kune
Do" (or its English translation) is probably not "generic" because the term is dis-
tinctive. It would be a different matter if the mark translated into "way of
fighting" or "way of Chinese fighting" or some other vague interpretation that
merely stated the nature of the thing it was representing. See supra note 170
and accompanying text. However, the words "intercepting" ("jeet") and "fist"
("kune") give the term distinction. See 1 LITTLE, WORDS OF THE DRAGON, supra
note 1, at 95. Also, the term itself only denotes a concept or principle of the art.
See supra note 40. The literal term does not sufficiently describe the art itself-
Bruce Lee's expression of combat included quite a variety of fighting techniques
as well as philosophical aspects. See LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note
4, at 104-05. Hence, "way of the intercepting fist" does not adequately define
the nature of the art. See CHRIS KENT & TIM TACKETT, JUN FAN/JEET KUNE DO
9 (1988). In addition, the mark has not become generic by developing such
popularity since its origination that the public uses the term as a generic name
for the product itself. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:9. That is, the
public does not refer to "Jeet Kune Do" as a synonym for "martial arts." Finally,
unlike many other martial arts, Jeet Kune Do has not lost all distinctiveness
because it is not hundreds or thousands of years old, with its exact origins ob-
scured over time. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. Rather, Jeet
Kune Do and the JKD mark are only about thirty years old, and the identifica-
tion of their originator is absolutely certain. See INOSANTO, supra note 38, at
66-67; 3 LITTLE, JEET KUNE Do, supra note 21, at 47; Tucci, supra note 36; in-
fra text accompanying note 188.
184. See 3 LITTLE, JEET KUNE Do, supra note 21, at 47; LITTLE, THE
WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 190; Tucci, supra note 36.
185. It is arguable that some individuals unfamiliar with the martial arts
could potentially confuse "Jeet Kune Do" with the Korean martial art, "Tae
Kwon Do." Similarly, the abbreviations for each, "JKD" and "TKD," may also be
considered confusing. However, "Tae Kwon Do" is a Korean term, while "Jeet
Kune Do" is Cantonese, a Chinese dialect. Hence, it is not likely that these
terms would be confusing to the most important consumers here-at least from
a trademark standpoint-those who speak the respective languages of the terms
involved. See supra notes 63-65. Also, no party could claim infringement upon
the term "Tae Kwon Do" because it is considered generic. See supra text accom-
panying note 172.
186. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:6.
187. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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term "Jeet Kune Do."'88 While the words used in the term are
not obsolete, its literal translation would be quite unfamiliar
to Cantonese-speaking consumers, 189 at least when originated.
It is arguable that because the mark is rooted in the
fencing term "stop-hit," it is merely descriptive. However, the
term itself does not accurately describe the art.9 ' In addition,
Bruce Lee replaced the word "hit" with "fist."'91 Further,
when Lee devised the translation for "stop" in the context of
what he wanted the term to mean, the best Cantonese inter-
pretation more accurately meant "intercepting. Finally,
the addition of "Do" also joined "way of' to the term. 9 ' While
some Cantonese speakers may possibly deduce that "way of,"
"intercepting," and "fist" denotes a martial art of some kind, it
is unlikely, especially since the term itself does not accurately
define what the art represents.'94 Taken together then, Can-
tonese-speaking consumers with no prior knowledge of Jeet
Kune Do would likely find the term "fanciful," and thus an
inherently descriptive mark.
Second, because "way of the intercepting fist" suggests
some qualities of the "product" the mark represents (i.e., a
fighting art), and since the term was based on the concepts of
simplicity, directness, efficiency, and adaptability, 9 5 the JKD
mark is arguably "suggestive." However, this classification is
doubtful since many Cantonese speakers would probably not
think "Jeet Kune Do," on its face, is a martial art. The gen-
eral public could not infer the concepts Jeet Kune Do is based
upon from the mark itself. Still, it is plausible that since the
JKD mark may suggest a martial art, it is "suggestive."
Third, if the JKD mark merely designates a martial art,
the term could be deemed "descriptive" because it simply de-
scribes an aspect of the product. In this case, the term would
not be inherently distinctive, and would hence require a
188. See 3 LITTLE, JEET KUNE Do, supra note 21, at 47; LITTLE, THE
WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 190; Tucci, supra note 36. Bruce Lee's tomb-
stone in Seattle, Washington is even inscribed: "Founder of Jeet Kune Do." L.
LEE, supra note 17, at 164.
189. See supra note 63.
190. See supra text accompanying note 183.
191. See INOSANTO, supra note 38, at 66-67.
192. See 1 LITTLE, WORDS OF THE DRAGON, supra note 1, at 164 n.5.
193. See 1 id.
194. See supra text accompanying note 183.
195. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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showing of acquired public recognition, or "secondary mean-
ing," to be a trademark.196 However, if JKD as a "suggestive"
mark is questionable, JKD as a "descriptive" mark is even
less likely since "way of the intercepting fist" does not cor-
rectly define the art it represents.'97 At most, the term char-
acterizes a concept that the art favors; however, even this is
not obvious, and thus, not thoroughly "descriptive."
In sum, "Jeet Kune Do" is likely the most distinctive type
of mark, "fanciful," although it is somewhat likely to be
deemed "suggestive." In either event, the mark is inherently
distinctive, and therefore "strong."'98 While finding the mark
"descriptive" is possible, this is improbable given the lack of
inherent descriptiveness of the mark itself in relation to what
it represents.
C. Abandonment
Even if the JKD mark is distinct, the issue remains as to
whether the Estate abandoned it in the years since Bruce
Lee's death. If abandonment has occurred, the mark becomes
part of the public domain and may be used by anyone. '
There has likely been a three-year period within the past
twenty-seven years when the Estate did not use the term
"Jeet Kune Do," or the initials "JKD," in some capacity. °° As
a result, prima facie abandonment (i.e., the rebuttable pre-
sumption of abandonment) is presumed. The Estate now has
the burden of showing that it did not abandon its proprietary
rights in the mark.20'
"Non-intentional" abandonment, which may result from
uncontrolled licensing of a mark, assigning a mark apart from
its goodwill, or the mark becoming generic,2 2 has not occurred
in the present case. The Estate has licensed Bruce Lee's pro-
prietary rights to a very select group,02 and has therefore not
196. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:15.
197. See supra text accompanying note 183.
198. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 11:14. Having a "strong" mark is
beneficial since it gives its owner broader trademark rights, and, in marginal
"likelihood of confusion" cases, the mark's owner is generally favored. See 2 id.
§ 11:6; see also 3 id. § 24:64.
199. See 2 id. § 17:1.
200. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, supra note 179.
201. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:18.
202. See supra notes 82-84.
203. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, supra note 179. Typi-
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engaged in uncontrolled licensing of the JKD mark. The Es-
tate has likewise not assigned or contracted any mark it
claims a right to apart from its goodwill."4 Finally, the JKD
mark is not generic.2 0
A more persuasive claim exists for abandonment through
"non-use" of the mark. Non-use abandonment requires "clear
and convincing" proof00 6 that the Estate had an "intent not to
resume"20 7 use of the mark. This is the Estate's most difficult
obstacle. While the Estate adamantly prohibits known in-
fringement of Bruce Lee's likeness and name, 208 the Estate
has taken no action against any party solely for an unau-
thorized use of the JKD mark.2 °9 While the Estate may argue
it never had reason to take such action, its failure to sue
third-party infringers greatly suggests abandonment,2 0 espe-
cially since the Estate consistently brought suit for other
types of infringement.21'
As Chang School of Judo & Karate, Inc. v. Dragon Gym,
Inc.212 illustrates, being the originator of a mark is insufficient
to establish a trademark-there must be actual use of the
mark.213  Bruce Lee used the JKD mark for at least seven
years before his death in 1973.214 To maintain its rights in the
mark, the Estate must show actual use or intent to continue
commercial use of the mark since that time, not merely token
cally, if the Estate discovers some type of unauthorized infringement of Bruce
Lee's name, likeness, or other proprietary right, the Estate tries to deter further
infringement with either a "cease and desist" letter or by trying to arrange a li-
censing agreement. If such measures are ineffective, the Estate usually files a
cause of action under California Civil Code § 990, which protects a deceased
personality's name, likeness, or distinctive characteristics from unauthorized
use. In total, the Estate has brought suit in at least a dozen instances. See gen-
erally CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1998); supra note 179.
204. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, supra note 179.
205. See supra text accompanying note 183.
206. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:12.
207. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998).
208. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, supra note 179; see also
supra note 203 and accompanying text.
209. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, supra note 179.
210. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:17.
211. See supra text accompanying note 203.
212. See Chang Sch. of Judo & Karate, Inc. v. Dragon Gym, Inc., No. 89-3064
1991 WL 15282, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1991).
213. See id. at *2.
214. "Jeet Kune Do" was coined sometime in 1965 or 1966; Bruce Lee passed
away in 1973. See 3 LITTLE, JEET KUNE Do, supra note 21, at 47; 1 LITTLE,
WORDS OF THE DRAGON, supra note 1; Tucci, supra note 36.
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use."' While temporary gaps within the past twenty-seven
years may be excused in certain circumstances, long periods
of delay require an explanation of good reason.216 Without
this showing of good reason, and in light of the lack of law-
suits brought by the Estate against potential infringers of the
JKD mark, a court may find abandonment.
As a defense, the Estate may emphasize the fact that it
has attentively maintained its "publicity" rights in Bruce
Lee's image and name against potential infringers.2" This
arguably indicates the Estate's intent to continue use of Lee's
proprietary rights, including rights in the marks he origi-
nated. Further, the Estate's failure to bring suit against any
party for infringing its rights in the JKD mark does not nec-
essarily evidence abandonment since an owner is not obli-
gated to sue for every infringing use.2"8 Therefore, if the Es-
tate demonstrates that it did not bring an infringement claim
against any infringer because it sincerely had no reason to
bring suit,219 abandonment is not proven. With these argu-
ments, therefore, the Estate could assert that the "clear and
convincing" abandonment standard is not met."'
D. Dilution & Fame
Assuming the above argument is persuasive and the Es-
tate rebuts prima facie and non-use abandonment, there are
still dilution issues involving the JKD mark. Dilution
through "blurring" of the term "Jeet Kune Do," either di-
rectly. or indirectly,"' has likely occurred to some degree
215. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:11.
216. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
217. See supra text accompanying note 203. The "right of publicity" is "the
inherent right of every human to control the commercial use of his or her iden-
tity." 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 28:1. Except for use of one's identity that
constitutes free speech or free press, this legal right is infringed through unau-
thorized use that will likely damage the commercial value of one's identity. See
4 id. Further, the present state of the law generally asserts that the right of
publicity is descendible property with an unconditional post-mortem duration.
See 4 id. § 28:45.
218. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:17.
219. This would occur, for example, if the Estate never encountered a use of
the JKD mark that it found offensive. See supra text accompanying note 104.
220. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 17:12.
221. Blurring of the JKD mark could occur directly through so-called Jeet
Kune Do instructors who do not have permission, either from Bruce Lee or the
Estate, to sell personal instruction, videotapes, or seminars under the name
recognition of"Jeet Kune Do."
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since 1973, despite the Estate's efforts. 23  Blurring occurs
when consumer confusion results from third parties' unau-
thorized use of the JKD mark on goods or services that are
not the original owner's goods or services.2" To a lesser ex-
tent, the JKD mark may also have been diluted by "tarnish-
ment," i.e., degradation of the mark's public reputation and
goodwill.225
The Lanham Act specifically grants a "famous mark" spe-
cial protection from dilution. 226  To determine whether "Jeet
Kune Do" is "famous" requires an evaluation of the eight
specified criteria in the Lanham Act.227
Factor (A), the degree of inherent or acquired distinctive-
ness of a mark,228 traditionally requires an allegedly famous
mark to evidence a significant showing of fame.29 As a result,
a sufficient level of fame among allegedly famous marks is
highly selective and discriminating.2 ° While the JKD mark is
quite famous among a specific segment of the population,23' it
is highly doubtful the mark meets this requirement in regard
222. Blurring of the JKD mark could occur indirectly through the blurring of
Bruce Lee's name and/or image; e.g., through unauthorized production of such
currently existing merchandise as posters, clothing, video game characters,
comic books, foreign stamps, dolls/statues, and the Bruce Lee-exploitation mov-
ies of Asia (i.e., typically low-budget movies of the 1970s and 1980s starring
Bruce Lee impersonators)-all of which capitalize on Bruce Lee's name and/or
likeness. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, supra note 179.
223. See supra text accompanying note 203.
224. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. This is less plausible than
"blurring" since "tarnishment" is typically associated with obscene, illegal, or
unwholesome products. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Therefore,
while unauthorized, the likely infringement claimed in terms of the JKD mark
(if in fact "Jeet Kune Do" is deemed a trademark) would probably not constitute
dilution by tarnishment. See supra text accompanying notes 221-22. However,
an argument can be made that the Bruce Lee-exploitation movies of Asia, inso-
far as they affect U.S. interstate commerce, qualify as a form of tarnishment
since such films likely degrade the reputation of both Bruce Lee and his art.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. For a brief discussion of
whether Bruce Lee's name can be trademarked and found a "famous mark" un-
der the Lanham Act, see infra note 303 and accompanying text.
227. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(1998); supra text accompanying note 112.
228. See Lanham Act § 43(c).
229. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
230. See 3 id.
231. Undoubtedly, this segment includes athletes, martial artists, and fans of
Bruce Lee around the world. See 2 LITTLE, THE TAO OF GUNG Fu, supra note 2,
at 199.
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to the general public, especially under the Lanham Act's rigid
scrutiny.
Factor (B), the duration and extent of a mark's use in
connection with the goods or services with which the mark is
used,232 essentially assesses the fame of the mark acquired
through secondary meaning.2 The "secondary meaning" re-
quired here must be greater than that necessary to convert a
"descriptive" mark into a trademark, since this factor evalu-
ates a mark's fame.2" Again, while "Jeet Kune Do" has ac-
quired secondary meaning among a specific segment of the
population,235 perhaps even to the degree of "fame," Jeet Kune
Do would not be nearly as popular among the general public.
Hence, the JKD mark would not likely meet this factor in a
broader regard.
Factor (C), the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity of the mark,2 6 evaluates the quality and quantity of
advertising and publicity of the mark. 7 Over the past
twenty-seven years, the Estate has engaged in several li-
censing agreements,"' endorsements,"' and various commer-
cial endeavors, 4 ° all of which affect the advertising and pub-
licity of the JKD mark. However, these efforts focus on a
specific target market, 4' and have not led to broad national
exposure. Consequently, while the various promotional and
publicity endeavors involving the JKD mark boost recognition
among a certain population segment,242 they have not led to
general recognition that JKD is a "famous" mark.
Factor (D), the geographical trading area of a mark,243 ex-
amines how far-reaching a mark's use is on a national scale.2
232. See Lanham Act § 43(c).
233. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
234. See 3 id.
235. See supra text accompanying note 231.
236. See Lanham Act § 43(c).
237. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
238. The Estate has licensed various memorabilia, such as clothing, pictures,
video documentaries, and statues. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Mar-
shall, supra note 179.
239. The Estate has endorsed various books, individuals, and organizations,
e.g., the Bruce Lee Educational Foundation. See id.
240. The Estate has also produced books and publications of its own. See id.
241. See supra text accompanying note 231.
242. See supra text accompanying note 231.
243. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(1998).
244. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
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This factor does not evaluate the fame of the JKD mark, but
rather its geographical extent of use. The Estate could easily
meet this criterion since many of its JKD-related endeavors
have national as well as international reach.24
246Factor (E), the "channels of trade" element, merely re-
quires definition of the specific market in which a mark is
famous.247 This factor also favors the Estate since the specific
segment of the population to which the JKD mark is used is
readily ascertainable: athletes, martial artists, and fans of
Bruce Lee.
Factor (F), a mark's recognition in diverse product
lines,24 8 underscores the fact that a mark famous only to a
specific population segment or market cannot be diluted
through use of the mark in an unrelated segment or mar-
ket.2"9 This aptly applies to the JKD mark since its popularity
is decidedly segmented. 5 ° As a result, even if found "famous"
among this particular market, the protection afforded to the
JKD mark could not be extended to products or services com-
pletely unattached to Bruce Lee, the Estate, Jeet Kune Do, or
the martial arts.
Factor (G), third-party use of the same or similar mark,251
asserts that a designation among a group of like marks is not
"famous."2 2 As stated earlier,253 various unauthorized uses of
the Estate's proprietary rights resulted in legal action by the
Estate whenever such infringement became known.254 How-
ever, the Estate never filed an action solely on the basis of
unauthorized use of the JKD mark.25  The relevancy of this
legal inaction depends upon the number of times third parties
245. Projects of the Estate that have had extremely broad geographic range
include films/documentaries, certain affiliations (e.g., the Bruce Lee Educa-
tional Foundation), and books (e.g., Bruce Lee's Fighting Method, volumes 1 to
4, and Tao of Jeet Kune Do have been sold in 9 languages). See 1-4 BRUCE LEE
& M. UYEHARA, BRUCE LEE'S FIGHTING METHOD (1976); B. LEE, supra note 23;
Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, supra note 179.
246. See Lanham Act § 43(c).
247. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
248. See Lanham Act § 43(c).
249. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
250. See supra text accompanying note 231.
251. See Lanham Act § 43(c).
252. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
253. See supra text accompanying note 222.
254. See supra text accompanying note 203.
255. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, supra note 179.
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have used the JKD mark in connection with a variety of goods
or services.256 The more third parties used the JKD mark for
the purpose of signifying a product, the less likely the mark is
identified with a single source. 57
Factor (H), determining how a mark was registered," as-
serts that failure to federally register a mark evidences the
owner's admission that the mark is not "famous."5 Moreo-
ver, it is inconsistent for the holder of a mark to assert that it
is "famous" under the Lanham Act, thereby empowering the
holder with special anti-dilution protection, when the mark is
unregistered.265 Neither Bruce Lee nor the Estate has ever
attempted to trademark "Jeet Kune Do" or "JKD."26' Given
the strict historical interpretation of this factor, the Estate
must explain why the unregistered JKD mark is still entitled
to "famous" status.262
Taken together, these eight factors indicate a strong
likelihood that the JKD mark is not nationally "famous" un-
der the Lanham Act's definition. However, this does not
mean that the mark is totally devoid of dilution protection.
Since JKD may be considered "famous" among a particular
segment of the population,262 the Estate may assert the Lan-
ham Act's dilution protections when another uses the JKD
mark for a product in the same or similar segment.264 Thus,
this anti-dilution protection is limited because it will not ap-
265ply to instances of dissimilar products or services.
Even this limited anti-dilution protection under the Lan-
ham Act is significant. Not only would it give the Estate na-
tional dilution protection (even if only to a particular market)
256. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92 n.37.
257. See 3 id.
258. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(1998).
259. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
260. See 3 id.
261. See Telephone Interview with Adrian Marshall, supra note 179; Tele-
phone Interview with James O'Neill, attorney of the Bruce Lee Estate and the
Bruce Lee Educational Foundation (Nov. 13, 1998).
262. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:92.
263. See supra text accompanying note 231.
264. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 24:112.
265. See 3 id. Practically speaking, however, this limitation is probably in-
significant since the term "Jeet Kune Do" would rarely be used in a context
other than in relation to Bruce Lee, the Estate, or the martial arts.
538 [Vol. 40
TRADEMARKING "JEET KUNE DO"
against any further domestic "blurring" "' or "tarnishment,"2 "7
it also reaches foreign activities affecting the Estate's trade-
mark rights in America and affecting U.S. interstate com-
merce.218 Such authority could also extend to foreign activi-
ties that only indirectly affect American commerce, 269 as well
as to cases where a domestic infringing party uses the Es-
tate's mark solely for export to foreign nations.27 ° Moreover,
being deemed "famous" to a particular population segment
under the Lanham Act may protect the JKD mark in nations
that recognize the "famous marks doctrine" as a means of
protecting well known, yet unregistered, foreign marks.27'
While the JKD mark may be independently "famous" in some
of these foreign nations,272 deeming the mark famous under
the Lanham Act only supports the Estate's foreign claims.273
E. Defenses
An alleged infringer may have several defenses for use of
the mark. First, an infringer may assert that the statute of
limitations has run on the infringement claim.2 4 While the
Lanham Act provides no defined statute of limitations, courts
usually adopt the state statute of limitations for similar sorts
of actions.27' Under this defense, the alleged infringer, with-
out arguing any merits of the case, simply asserts that the
Estate's delay in bringing suit for the statutory period bars its
opportunity to file an infringement claim. While this defense
is available in some instances, an alleged infringer will more
likely assert the estoppel by laches defense against the delay
in bringing suit.2
76
Laches involves a delay that results in prejudice to the
alleged infringer, which in turn serves as some bar to relief.277
While there is no established consensus on what amount of
266. See supra text accompanying notes 221-22.
267. See supra text accompanying note 225.
268. See supra text accompanying note 122.
269. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
270. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 29:59.
271. See 4 id. § 29:61.
272. See supra notes 4 and 245 and accompanying text.
273. See supra text accompanying note 111.
274. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (6th ed. 1990).
275. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:33; supra notes 135 and 136.
276. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:31.
277. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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delay justifies a laches defense, the case law seems to allow
no delay longer than fifteen years.278 Assuming an infringer
began use of the JKD mark immediately following Bruce
Lee's death279 (i.e., when the mark ceased active use by its
originator), the Estate would have to account for a delay as
long as twenty-seven years. Assuming this worst-case sce-
nario, such an extended delay in bringing suit would un-
doubtedly merit a laches defense. This long delay could estop
the Estate's infringement claim even in cases where there is a
high likelihood of confusion or where a third party knowingly
and deliberately infringed the JKD mark.28°
Such delays could be absolved, however, if the Estate
gave a valid reason for the delay.28' For example, in Gracie v.
Gracie, the court overlooked a five-year delay in bringing suit
because of other litigation involving the trademark holder
and the lack of notice of the infringing use. 82 The Estate may
similarly argue that "other litigation" prevented a more im-
mediate suit. While the Estate has engaged in a number of
lawsuits,283 the Estate could probably not cite twenty-seven
years' worth of continuous litigation that prevented it from
filing suit. The Estate might prevail if it cited a lack of notice
of the infringing use in question.284 Of course, the credibility
of this argument varies on a case-by-case basis. However,
case law suggests that even a lack of notice may not excuse
such a long delay.2"
For some alleged infringers, "acquiescence" may provide
a valid defense.2 6 "Acquiescence" requires a delay in bringing
suit and an implication of active consent by the trademark
owner, whether by word or deed, to use the mark.287 Under
the unique circumstances surrounding the JKD mark, Bruce
Lee or the Estate may have granted consent to use the
278. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:29.
279. See 1 LITTLE, WORDS OF THE DRAGON, supra note 1, at 160.
280. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, §§ 31:9-:10.
281. See 5 id. § 31:14.
282. See Gracie v. Gracie, No. C94-4156SC, 1998 WL 164955, at *2, *3 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 13, 1998).
283. See supra text accompanying note 203; see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note
43, § 31:16.
284. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:17.
285. See 5 id. § 31:30 n.3.
286. See 5 id. § 31:41.
287. See 5 id. § 31:42.
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mark.288 In either instance, reliance on such consent for a
long period of time likely precludes any attempted revocation
of consent by the Estate.
In sum, there are potentially strong defenses available to
third parties if the Estate were to file suit for infringement.
Generally, the longer an alleged infringer used the JKD mark
the more likely a defense will be successful because of the ex-
ceptionally long period of potential delay in this case.
F. Originator's Intent and Jeet Kune Do as a "Class"
Finally, there are some novel arguments against trade-
marking the JKD mark at all. First, Bruce Lee maintained
the following views on the importance of the term "Jeet Kune
Do":
I stress again, I have not created or invented any kind of
martial art. Jeet Kune Do is derived from what I have
learned, plus my evaluation of it. Thus, my JKD is not
confined by any kind of martial arts. On the contrary, I
welcome those who like JKD to study it and improve it.
289
"Very often when people talk about JKD, they are very
much concerned about its title. Actually, the title is not im-
portant. It's only a symbol for the kind of martial art we
study."29° "If people say Jeet Kune Do is different from 'this'
or from 'that,' then let the name of Jeet Kune Do be wiped
out, for that is what it is, just a name. Please don't fuss over
it.,,291
From these remarks, it can be reasonably inferred that
Lee did not particularly care about the mark itself. Further,
Lee may have never intended for Jeet Kune Do to become the
"Gospel Truth' 29 2 in the minds of its practitioners or for third
288. See, e.g., Tami Goldsmith, Dan Inosanto Puts His Fist Down!, BLACK
BELT, Jan. 1997, at 39.
289. 3 LITTLE, JEET KUNE DO, supra note 21, at 55.
290. 3 id. at 49.
291. B. LEE, TAO OF JEET KUNE DO, supra note 23, at 208.
292. Bruce Lee summarized his dislike of martial art "styles" in the follow-
ing:
I do not teach because I do not believe in styles anymore. I mean I do
not believe that there is such a thing as, like, "the Chinese way" of
fighting or the "Japanese way" of fighting . . .or whatever "way" of
fighting, because unless a human being has three arms and four legs,
there can be no different form of fighting. But, basically, we only have
two hands and two feet. So styles tend to separate man-because they
have their own doctrines and the doctrine became the Gospel Truth
2000]
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parties to fight over rights to the mark in court. Thus, since
the originator of the mark293 never placed much emphasis on
the importance of the actual JKD term, no third party should
have a right to claim its ownership.
On a somewhat related rationale, it may be argued that
the philosophy behind Jeet Kune Do makes the art amor-
phous, and therefore impossible to define. The tenets of (1)
researching your own experience, (2) absorbing what is use-
ful, (3) rejecting what is useless, and (4) adding what is spe-
cifically your own,294 makes "Jeet Kune Do" different for every
practitioner. Hence, it is arguable that vesting the use of the
JKD mark in one party is improper since the art of Jeet Kune
Do is not a rigid curriculum, but more accurately a "class" of
martial arts.295 Therefore, as a class of martial arts, Jeet
Kune Do cannot be trademarked.
The first argument regarding the originator's intent, al-
though possessing intuitive validity, does not necessarily
have legal standing. A trademark is fundamentally a unique
designator of a product or source.296 If used to designate a
product, a trademark is likely to result297 regardless of the in-
tent of the originator. This is precisely how Bruce Lee used
the term "Jeet Kune Do"-as a unique mark describing his
expression of the martial arts, and therefore a designation of
what he taught to others.298 Once a mark is used in this way
in commerce, the Lanham Act does not require the origina-
that you cannot change! But, if you do not have styles, if you just say
"here I am as a human being. How can I express myself totally and
completely?"-now that way, you won't create a style because style is a
crystallization. That way [the opposite of style] is a process of con-
tinuing growth.
3 LITTLE, JEET KUNE Do, supra note 21, at 59-60.
293. See 3 LITTLE, JEET KLNE Do, supra note 21, at 47; LITTLE, THE
WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 190; Tucci, supra note 36.
294. See LITTLE, THE WARRIOR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 114.
295. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. Note that the use of "class"
in the text is not to be confused with the various classes assigned to goods and
services associated with a mark upon trademark registration. For example,
such trademark classes of goods include "chemicals," "machinery," and "cloth-
ing," while service classes include "advertising and business," "telecommunica-
tions," and "treatment of materials." 37 C.F.R. § 6.1 (1973). The statutory
authority to establish such a classification system is given to the PTO's Com-
missioner of Patents and Trademarks. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham
Act) § 30, 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (1998).
296. See supra note 43.
297. See supra note 43.
298. See 3 LITTLE, JEET KUNE Do, supra note 21, at 59.
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tor's intent to create a trademark. Therefore, while Bruce
Lee may not have planned to create a trademark, he in fact
originated a unique mark used in commerce to distinguish his
product, and thereby created a trademark.299 Bruce Lee's in-
tent not to place importance on the term "Jeet Kune Do" does
not invalidate the establishment of a trademark.
The second argument, that Jeet Kune Do is a "class" of
martial arts and is thus unable to be trademarked, has more
merit. If in fact Jeet Kune Do is deemed a "class" of martial
arts, it cannot be trademarked.300 Given the lack of case law
in this area, the ultimate determination of this issue is uncer-
tain. In evaluating this issue, the presiding court must focus
on the issue of distinctiveness, both in terms of the art and
the "Jeet Kune Do" mark itself.3 '
V. PROPOSAL
There are several actions the Estate may take to protect
its property rights. First, the Estate should attempt to feder-
ally register the marks "Jeet Kune Do" and "JKD."3 °2 In addi-
tion, the Estate should consider seeking a trademark in the
name "Bruce Lee," since federal trademark protection is very
broad, both domestically and internationally.3 3
299. Although he stated numerous times his intent not to have Jeet Kune Do
be thought of as a "style," Bruce Lee did acknowledge that he needed to desig-
nate his art somehow, even if only for convenience's sake. See supra notes 23,
34, and 292 and accompanying text. Thus, the basic requirement that the mark
be used to distinguish Lee's "product" was satisfied.
300. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
302. A search of federal trademarks revealed that neither "Jeet Kune Do" nor
"JKD" have been federally registered. The PTO maintains a web site from
which members of the public can determine whether a mark has been regis-
tered. See U.S. Trademark Boolean Search Page (visited Jan. 22, 1999)
<http://trademarks.uspto.gov>.
303. A search of federal trademarks revealed that "Bruce Lee" has not been
federally registered. See id.
The Lanham Act does allow the trademark of a surname if secondary
meaning can be shown, which is a burden the Estate could likely meet. See
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(e)(4), (f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4), (M
(1998). In fact, the Estate is more likely able to register Bruce Lee's name than
"Jeet Kune Do," given Bruce Lee's widespread popularity compared to Jeet
Kune Do's more segmented notoriety. See supra notes 4 and 231 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, the fact that the Estate has actively pursued protection of
its proprietary rights in Bruce Lee's name and likeness, while also engaging in
commercial endeavors in these rights, evidences the Estate's "substantial exclu-
sive and continuous use" of the mark. Lanham Act § 2(f); see supra notes 203
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If the PTO rejects these trademark applications, the Es-
tate should contemplate registering with state trademark of-
fices. While not as far-reaching or influential as federal pro-
tection, state trademark registration may still be beneficial, °4
particularly in states where infringement is most frequent.
Though not ideal, state protection is preferable to no preser-
vation of rights at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bruce Lee Estate must overcome many obstacles to
preserve its trademark rights in the "Jeet Kune Do" mark.
First, the Estate must establish that the mark has sufficient
distinctiveness. 30 5 "Jeet Kune Do" would most likely be found
the most distinctive type of mark, "fanciful," or possibly "sug-
gestive."3 °6 In either case, the mark would be deemed inher-
ently distinctive, and therefore "strong."
30 7
Even if distinct, the issue of abandonment of the mark in
the twenty-seven years since Bruce Lee's death remains. Al-
though the mark was probably not "non-intentionally" aban-
doned, the Estate must rebut the presumption of prima facie
abandonment . 3 " Even more problematic, the Estate must
show that abandonment through "non-use" of the mark has
not occurred. 9 Under this claim, an alleged infringer must
and 238-40 and accompanying text.
Here, national registration is preferable since the Estate's use of California
Civil Code § 990 is much more limited in terms of jurisdictional reach than the
federal Lanham Act, which has great domestic and international authority. See
supra notes 122-25 and 203 and accompanying text.
If the Estate is granted registration in Bruce Lee's name, it may then bol-
ster its protection further by asserting in subsequent lawsuits that the mark is
"famous" under the Lanham Act. See Lanham Act § 43(c). If the Estate can
meet the requisite standards, of which there is a good possibility, the Estate
would have expanded rights against dilution, and not just protection in in-
stances of overt infringement. See supra notes 106, 107, and 111 and accompa-
nying text.
304. See GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 46, at 45. Of course, federal registra-
tion rights would take precedent over state registration rights. See id. For ex-
ample, where another party already has federal rights to a mark, one's subse-
quent state registration would be invalidated; or where the federal PTO
declares a mark "generic," this would also invalidate one's subsequent state
trademark registration.
305. See supra Part IV.B.
306. See supra Part IV.B.
307. See supra Part IV.B.
308. See supra Part IV.C.
309. See supra Part IV.C.
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show by "clear and convincing" evidence that the Estate in-
tended not to resume use of the JKD mark.31°
The Estate's best defense against non-use abandonment
is to emphasize the fact that it has attentively maintained its
"publicity" rights in Bruce Lee's image and name against po-
tential infringers. This arguably indicates the Estate's intent
to continue use of Bruce Lee's proprietary rights.31  The Es-
tate must also explain that not bringing suit against any
party for infringing its right in the JKD mark does not neces-
sarily evidence abandonment since the owner of a mark is not
obligated to sue every infringing use.312 With these argu-
ments, the Estate may assert that the "clear and convincing"
standard is not met.313
Assuming the above arguments are persuasive and the
Estate rebuts prima facie and non-use abandonment, dilution
issues of the JKD mark remain. Dilution through "blurring"
and "tarnishment" of the term "Jeet Kune Do" has likely oc-
curred since Bruce Lee's death in 1973, despite the Estate's
efforts to oppose infringement.314
The Estate may seek special protection from dilution by
attempting to gain the Lanham Act's "famous mark" status.3
However, an evaluation of the Lanham Act's eight statutory
factors indicates that the JKD mark is not nationally "fa-
mous" under the Lanham Act's strict specifications.316 Al-
though not nationally "famous," the JKD mark is probably
famous among a specific population segment. 17  Even this
limited "famous" status not only gives the Estate significant
national anti-dilution protection, but also meaningful foreign
protection.38  Hence, the potential reach of the Estate's
authority to stop "Jeet Kune Do" infringement could be quite
broad.
However, in addition to the preceding abandonment ar-
guments, there are several valid defenses available to third
310. See supra Part IV.C.
311. See supra Part IV.C.
312. See supra Part IV.C.
313. See supra Part IV.C.
314. See supra Part IV.D.
315. See supra Part IV.D.
316. See supra Part IV.D.
317. See supra Part IV.D.
318. See supra Part IV.D.
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parties."9 Such defenses include statute of limitations, estop-
pel by laches, and acquiescence.2 ° While the merit of such de-
fenses would vary from case to case, they remain viable ar-
guments for alleged infringers to justify their otherwise
infringing use.3 ' Further, the Estate may have to reconcile
issues involving Bruce Lee's intent regarding the mark's use
and whether Jeet Kune Do is a distinct martial art or merely
a martial arts "class."3 2
Despite these obstacles, however, the Estate still has a
significant chance of obtaining at least some rights in Bruce
Lee's Jeet Kune Do trademark 32 ' The Estate should seize
this opportunity to better protect itself and the proprietary
rights of Bruce Lee."4
319. See supra Part IV.E.
320. See supra Part IV.E.
321. See supra Part IV.E.
322. See supra Part IV.F.
323. See supra Part V.
324. See supra Part V.
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